

# CIA Administrative Instructions

## ☐ Security

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

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ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO: [REDACTED]

13 February 1951

SUBJECT: Security Approval for Employment Interviews

1. Discussions of employment, beyond general preliminary interviews, should not be held with any applicant without prior approval of the Inspection and Security Office.
2. Both telephonic and written requests for employment interview clearances will be received by the Chief, Security Division, or his Deputy, through the Chief of the appropriate Personnel Branch. These requests should be accompanied by pertinent identifying information which must include, as a minimum, the applicant's full name and address and the name and address of his present employer.
3. Exceptions to this requirement may be approved for interviews for specific positions by the Assistant Deputy (Inspection and Security).
4. Approval for employment interviews does not waive necessity for final security approval of the individual in the event he is selected for employment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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[REDACTED]  
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MURRAY MCCONNEL  
Deputy Director  
(Administration)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

2 February 1950

STATINTL

SUBJECT: Awards from Foreign Governments.

REFERENCE: Memorandum from the President on above subject to Heads of  
Executive Departments and Establishments, dated 6 January  
1950 (copy attached).

1. Paragraph 1 of the reference requires the following action on  
the part of CIA:

Any employee tendered a gift, decoration, award or any other  
thing by a foreign government while employed by CIA will immediately  
prepare a report of such for transmittal through his Assistant  
Director or Staff Chief to the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff.

2. The Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, will review such data,  
take any action consistent with CIA policy and security and, if appropri-  
ate, prepare the required report for the Secretary of State.

3. The report will be submitted to the Director in sufficient time  
to enable signature and delivery to the Department of State by 30 December  
of each year.

4. Data on any case now pending for consideration by the current  
session of the 81st Congress should be processed immediately to the Chief,  
Inspection and Security Staff, who will prepare any required report for  
action by the Director not later than 15 February 1950.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

STATINTL

Acting Executive

Attachment: Memorandum from the President, dated  
6 January 1950.

DISTRIBUTION: - ALL CIA EMPLOYEES

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
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1950

TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS:

Except where other procedures are authorized by law (as, for example, in the case of personnel of the Armed Forces under certain circumstances), each department and establishment hereafter will comply with the following procedures with respect to requesting the consent of Congress for their personnel to accept gifts, decorations, awards, or any other thing tendered to them by a foreign government:

1. Annually, in the month of December of each year, each agency will compile and transmit to the Secretary of State a list of all active, former or retired personnel for whom the Department of State, under the provisions of the Act of January 31, 1881 (U. S. Code, Title V, Section 115), is holding decorations, awards, medals, gifts, orders, or any other thing tendered to such personnel by foreign governments and for the acceptance of which the agency desires to request the consent of Congress. All necessary supporting documentation will be submitted with the list and will include the full name of the recipient, the name of the donor government, the name or title or other identification of the thing to be accepted and such other information as may be deemed pertinent.
2. The Secretary of State will cause consolidated lists to be compiled by departments in the form of an omnibus authorizing bill which it will transmit to the Congress as the situation requires, but in no event oftener than once during each session of the Congress, provided, that with respect to retired officers or employees the provisions of the Act of June 27, 1934 (U. S. Code, Title V, Section 115 (a)), shall apply.
3. Each department and establishment will be prepared to provide, on behalf of any individual, such further information as the appropriate Committees of the Congress may require with respect to any award tendered to such person.
4. Before submitting any consolidated list to the Congress, the Secretary of State will cause the list to be reviewed in order to ascertain whether there be any objection to the acceptance of any award therein proposed from the point of view of the foreign policy of the United States. If there be any such objection, the matter will be referred to the President for his decision.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

15 February 1950

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ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

SUBJECT: Classified Contract Security

1. This Instruction establishes special procedures normally involved in procuring equipment and services through classified contracts.

2. Contractor Clearance

a. When a need exists for procuring classified equipment or services, procurement of intelligence information excepted, the Assistant Director or Staff Chief concerned shall, prior to contact with prospective contractors, concurrently notify:

(1) The Contracting Officer of the nature of the equipment or services required and consult with the Contracting Officer with respect to prospective contractors available as sources of procurement.

(2) The Inspection and Security Staff of the sensitivity, and, if the project will be submitted to the Projects Review Committee, the approximate date of the hearing.

b. The Contracting Officer will:

(1) Obtain Personnel Security Questionnaires (NME Form 48) from all contractor employees with whom the project will be discussed and forward them to the Inspection and Security Staff.

(2) Prior to furnishing classified material or information to a contractor, the Contracting Officer shall require the contractor to execute an appropriate Secrecy Agreement.

(3) When a contractor is selected the Contracting Officer will provide him with a copy of the CIA Security Requirements for Contractors and advise him of the importance of maintaining CIA security standards.

c. The Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, will:

(1) Review the security classification of the project and advise as to its fitness.

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(2) Conduct security investigations to establish clearance or non-clearance of contractor employees mentioned above, obtain credit rating and general reputation of prospective contractors and will forward appropriate information to the Contracting Officer.

### 3. Personnel Clearance

a. When the Contracting Officer is reasonably certain that a contract will be awarded, he shall obtain from the contractor, and forward to the Inspection and Security Staff for action, Personnel Security Questionnaires covering all persons who will be directly concerned with the project or cognizant of its nature. When the contract becomes effective, and thereafter, the Contracting Officer will obtain from the contractor and forward to the Inspection and Security Staff Personnel Security Questionnaires covering additional personnel not previously considered who may become aware of the project.

b. The Inspection and Security Staff will inform the Contracting Officer of the results of security investigations, that is, whether clearances are granted or persons are not approved for employment. The Contracting Officer will advise the contractor of security clearances issued. Inspection and Security Staff in coordination with the Contracting Officer will notify the contractor of non-clearances.

c. The Contracting Officer will notify Inspection and Security Staff when the employment of contractor personnel is transferred or terminated and, if for cause, the reasons therefor.

### 4. Physical Inspections

When a sensitive classified contract is awarded, or upon request of the Contracting Officer, the Inspection and Security Staff shall review available information and if necessary physically inspect the contractor's plant to determine the nature and extent of security precautions required to meet CIA security standards and submit a report of findings.

5. The CIA Security Requirements for Contractors and the Secrecy Agreement will be incorporated into the contract by reference and made a part thereof.

6. The Contracting Officer will advise the Inspection and Security Staff when a contract is completed or terminated. After a contract has been completed or terminated a new security clearance is required for subsequent contracts.

7. The Inspection and Security Staff will notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the security features of appropriate classified contracts.


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8. Request for any exceptions to the provisions of this Instruction will be submitted to the Executive with appropriate justification.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:



Executive

Attachment: CIA Security Requirements for Contractors

DISTRIBUTION: A.

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CONFIDENTIALCIA SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTORS

The following information, security measures and safeguards are provided for contractors in order that they may establish practices and procedures which will insure adequate protection for information, material, or equipment of a classified nature pertaining to contracts with the Central Intelligence Agency.

I. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

1. "Security Classification" is a means of indicating the sensitivity of information, material, or equipment which is to be protected. Security classification is identified by one of four designations, namely, "Top Secret", "Secret", "Confidential", or "Restricted". Material bearing any one of such designations is generally referred to as "Classified".

2. Classified information, material, or equipment shall not be discussed with or made known to unauthorized persons.

3. One of the cardinal principles of security is to restrict the knowledge of classified information only to those persons who must have it. No one should know of classified matter unless he needs to know. Specifically, with respect to classified CIA contracts, it is emphasized that knowledge of the association of CIA with the contract is in all cases one of the primary classified features which must be restricted to the fewest persons possible.

4. The rules set out herein have been made for the purpose of preventing the knowledge of classified information from being gained, either through carelessness or intent, by any unauthorized person or persons.

II. PERSONNEL

1. The contractor will submit immediately, upon request by CIA, Personnel Security Questionnaires to provide information necessary for security clearance, in accordance with CIA standards, for all employees who will have knowledge of the contract or will have access to classified material or information relating to the contract. The number of such persons will be kept to a minimum and an accurate record of their identities maintained.

2. At any time during the course of a classified contract when it is determined that new or additional employees or executives will be required to have access to or knowledge of classified material concerning the contract, Personnel Security Questionnaires will be submitted from such personnel without delay by the contractor to the CIA Contracting Officer.

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3. The Contracting Officer, CIA, shall be notified immediately upon the transfer, for cause, of an employee from work concerned with a classified contract, or upon the termination, for cause, of the employment of any employee who has knowledge of a CIA classified contract, with a statement of the reasons for such transfer or termination.

4. The Contracting Officer, CIA, shall be notified immediately in the event of labor disturbances which might affect the contract.

5. In the event of any impending action which might result in seizure or litigation affecting the security of the contract, the Contracting Officer shall be immediately notified.

6. Contractors shall maintain adequate control of the movements of employees and visitors to insure that only authorized persons have access to the restricted areas and to classified material, equipment, or information relating to the contract. The methods of insuring such control will vary, depending upon the size, organization and physical layout of the plant and the classification of the project. In large organizations, personnel engaged on CIA classified projects shall be provided with a means of identification to gain access to restricted areas.

7. All overtime work must be properly supervised to insure appropriate security safeguards.

### III. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, DOCUMENTS, MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. In view of the wide differences in organization, arrangement and physical make-up of individual plants, no specific requirements pertaining to those physical protection measures, such as fences, identification systems, alarm systems, floodlights, fire prevention and fire fighting measures, etc., are set out herein. Each contractor will provide such protective measures as are considered appropriate by the Contracting Officer or Inspection and Security Staff.

2. The following requirements are considered to be the minimum to afford adequate protection for the majority of sensitive contracts. Modification of some of these requirements may be granted by written authorization from the CIA Contracting Officer whenever such modification appears to be warranted. In the case of "Top Secret" contracts, special indoctrination will be given.

a. Entrance to and egress from a plant or restricted area thereof shall be strictly controlled at all times to admit only authorized persons. The names of authorized visitors will be recorded.

b. Local conditions at the plant, such as physical make-up and the classification of the project, will determine the necessity for guard service. Merchant service patrols are not considered adequate

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protection in cases where twenty-four hour guard service is deemed necessary. In some instances protection during non-working hours by an alarm system approved by CIA will be considered adequate where twenty-four hour guard service is considered necessary.

c. Employees shall be warned against discussing any phase of the contract or their work with any unauthorized person or in the presence of such a person.

d. Telephones will not be used for the discussion of matters pertaining to classified projects unless absolutely necessary. If it becomes necessary to use the telephone, great care must be taken so as not to disclose classified information.

e. Persons other than authorized employees of the contractor, such as prospective sub-contractors, consultants, salesmen, etc., will not be given information or have access to documents, material or equipment pertaining to a classified contract, except on written authorization of CIA.

f. All correspondence and documents which divulge classified information relating to the contract must bear the same classification as the contract. The classification "Top Secret", "Secret", "Confidential", or "Restricted" must be stamped or typed at the top and bottom of each page of every document so classified which is not permanently bound or fastened. Permanently bound classified documents need only be marked as to security classification on the front and back covers, title page, and first and last pages.

g. All classified documents, material or equipment, except "Restricted" must be stored in vaults, safes or cabinets which are locked with 3-way combination locks or approved equivalent. Guards or other acceptable protective measures shall be provided for classified items which are required to be so stored but which are too large to be contained in safes or vaults. "Restricted" documents, material or equipment may be stored in ordinary file cabinets, desk drawers, etc. If approved storage facilities described above are not readily available or if it is impracticable to procure them, the Contracting Officer should be notified immediately in order that specific attention may be given the problem.

h. Material or equipment, of a nature requiring classification, but on which it is impracticable to stamp or affix a classification designation, will be protected, nevertheless, in the manner proscribed above for such classified material or equipment.

i. Employees will not leave rooms unoccupied at any time if classified documents, materials or equipment are exposed. If it is necessary to leave a room unoccupied, all classified material must first be securely locked in the proper safeguarding equipment.

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j. No employee will permit classified papers to be exposed in such a fashion that they could be read by unauthorized persons.

k. Combinations to safes and cabinets in which classified material is stored will be furnished only to those persons who are required to have same. Factory combinations will not be used. The combinations should be changed periodically and in all instances when an employee having knowledge of the combination leaves the employ of the contractor or is transferred to a position in which knowledge of the contract information is no longer necessary.

l. Possession of keys will be restricted to the minimum number of persons practicable for efficient operations and a register shall be maintained of the distribution. The return of all keys shall be required at termination of employment on the contract. If necessary, due to key losses, locks will be changed.

m. A system of "charge-out" records shall be established where practicable for all classified documents or material taken from their storage depositories. Such charge-outs should be checked at the close of each work day to insure the return of all charged out material.

n. Copies of all classified documents relating to CIA contracts must be held to the minimum consistent with operational necessity. Inter-office distribution shall be effected when possible by circulation of one copy with assurance that it is returned to the proper depository.

o. At the close of each work day a security check of the premises must be made by a responsible employee to insure that all classified material has been properly stored and that all repositories are properly locked.

p. In case of loss or compromise of any classified document, material or equipment the Contracting Officer shall be notified immediately.

q. Preliminary drafts, copies, carbons, stencils, stenographic notes, work sheets, spoiled copies, and the like, pertaining to classified matter, until properly disposed of, must be safeguarded in the same manner as classified documents. The disposal of such material should be by burning, under the supervision of a responsible person. Care should be taken not to allow such material to be put in waste baskets and handled in the ordinary manner of waste disposal. Adequate protection of wire, wax and other similar recordings of classified information must be afforded until the classified information is removed.

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x. An appropriate Secrecy Agreement will be signed by each contractor at the appropriate time, depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the project or contract.

y. If a question arises concerning appropriate security practice it should be referred to the Contracting Officer for advice.

3. Whenever CIA considers it advisable, security inspections of contractor's premises will be made.

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4. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will be notified by CIA of the existence of classified contracts. FBI representatives may be expected to call upon contractors to establish liaison contacts for use in the event of emergency or compromise of information which would threaten the security of classified information, documents, materials or equipment involved in the contract.

5. Effective security is largely a matter of habit and good judgment. Daily operations should be performed in such a manner that security at no time will be compromised. It is not intended, nor is it considered desirable, that these Security Requirements in their entirety be distributed to all employees concerned with the classified contract. However, it is the contractor's responsibility to insure that each employee concerned with the contract is thoroughly indoctrinated with those provisions which are applicable to his participation in the project and signs a Secrecy Agreement in appropriate cases as determined by the Inspection and Security Staff.

6. The contractor agrees to insert in all sub-contracts under this contract involving knowledge of the classified material, provisions which shall conform substantially to the language of the security requirements set forth herein.

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R E S T R I C T E D

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

STATINTL

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

4 October 1949

SUBJECT: Taking or Giving of Unofficial Study Courses  
by Persons Employed by or Assigned to CIA

1. Pending revision of CIA Security Regulations, authority for approval of applications for the taking or giving of unofficial courses of study submitted by persons employed by or assigned to CIA is delegated as indicated below:

a. To the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, when the application covers courses having a bearing on intelligence activities, e.g., international politics, economics, languages, etc. or courses to be taken or given in the smaller tutoring type school.

b. To Assistant Directors and Staff Chiefs concerned when the application covers courses other than those indicated in paragraph "a" above when in their opinion no security implications are involved. The application and a copy of the letter of approval will be forwarded to the Inspection and Security Staff.

2. The Inspection and Security Staff will be consulted in those cases where a question arises regarding security implications.

3. Any provisions of the CIA Security Regulations, dated 15 August 1947, in conflict with this Instruction are rescinded.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

STATINTL

Executive

DISTRIBUTION: All CIA Employees

R E S T R I C T E D

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

25X1A

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

10 August 1949

SUBJECT: Authorization of Couriers and Guards to Carry Firearms.

REFERENCE: Central Intelligence Act of 1949, Public Law 110-81st  
Congress, approved 20 June 1949.

1. Under reference law, couriers and guards are authorized to carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials affecting the national defense and security.

2. The following general policies will apply:

a. Authority is limited to those instances involving risk or danger of theft.

b. Normally, couriers in the Washington Metropolitan Area need not be armed.

c. Carrying personal firearms while on official business is prohibited.

3. The Chief of Inspection and Security, acting for the Director, is responsible for:

a. Authorizing the carrying of firearms in each case.

b. Issuing necessary credentials.

c. Assuring the individual's familiarity with the weapon from official records or through training. An issue of up to 100 rounds of ammunition per individual for training is hereby authorized.

d. Assuring that arms and ammunition are returned daily, immediately after the trip for which issued, or as soon as the need no longer exists.

e. Instructing all persons in civilian clothes as to concealment of arms. Military personnel in uniform will comply with service regulations.

f. Coordination to insure proper accounting and maintenance of arms and ammunition.

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4. Assistant Directors and Staff Chiefs will:

a. Furnish to the Chief of Inspection and Security (with justifications):

(1) Names and assignments of individuals and alternates required to carry firearms either on a continuing basis, frequently, or occasionally by specific request.



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b. Issue the necessary instructions for the use of firearms outside the United States.

c. Refer to the Chief, Inspection and Security, any request for exceptions to the provisions of this Instruction.

5. Nothing herein applies to the official use of firearms for authorized operational or training purposes, or to the authorized arming of couriers or guards outside of the United States.

*R. H. Hillenkoetter*  
R. H. HILLENKOETTER  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

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~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO. 

30 June 1949

STATINTL

SUBJECT: Security Violation Penalty System.

1. A guide for the imposition of penalties for violation of CIA security regulations is given below:

## a. First Violation:

(1) Verbal reprimand by division or higher chief and warning of possible consequences of further violations.

(2) Security-check duty for one week under direction of the appropriate staff duty officer.

## b. Second Violation:

(1) Written reprimand and warning by Assistant Director or Staff Chief.

(2) Security-check duty for two or more weeks under direction of the appropriate staff duty officer.

## c. Third Violation:

(1) Suspension without pay for a period not less than one week and not more than four weeks.

(2) Written warning from the Personnel Officer as to consequences of a fourth violation.

## d. Fourth Violation: Termination of employment with CIA.

2. The above guide will not be a bar to immediate termination of employment due to any security violation considered sufficiently serious to warrant such action.

3. Security violations will be reported in writing, by branch chiefs or officials holding similar supervisory positions, to the Assistant Director or Staff Chief concerned, including:

a. Name of offender and nature of violation.

b. Opinion as to seriousness, and whether carelessness or negligence were involved.

c. Statement by the offender.

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## d. Recommendation of penalty.

4. a. Assistant Directors and Staff Chiefs will determine seriousness of offense and whether a penalty should be imposed, and will direct imposition of first and second violation penalties when appropriate.

b. Recommendation for imposition of third and fourth violation penalties, or dismissal for other than a fourth violation penalty, will be forwarded to the Personnel Officer, with all papers on the case concerned.

5. a. These instructions shall apply to personnel detailed to duty with CIA from other government agencies except that the relief of such an individual from duty with CIA and return to his parent agency will be recommended in lieu of suspension or termination of employment.

b. Such an individual may elect to request reference of his case to the agency from which detailed rather than accept the penalty prescribed by paragraphs 1a and b. In such a case a report of the circumstances will be forwarded through the Executive for reference to the appropriate agency.

6. Assistant Directors, Staff Chiefs and the Personnel Officer are charged with informing the Chief of Inspection and Security of findings and punitive action taken by them in connection with each security violation for which penalties are imposed under these regulations.

7. As an incentive toward security-mindedness in the individual, and in order to remove a burden from the individual who has clearly demonstrated that he is no longer a risk with respect to physical security matters, the following exceptions to paragraph 1 are directed:


a. If the first violation occurs on a date more than two years after an individual first enters on duty with CIA, the particular provisions of paragraph 1a(1) shall not be applied.

b. If an individual serves two continuous years without a security violation, any or all violations which he committed prior to the commencement of said two year period shall be stricken from the records, insofar as the application of this Administrative Instruction is concerned.

8. Assistant Directors and Staff Chiefs will inform their employees of their security records under this policy.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Executive

DISTRIBUTION: ALL CIA EMPLOYEES.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

STATINTL

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

3 January 1949

SUBJECT: Physical Penetration, CIA Buildings or Areas--  
Employee Action.

1. When an employee discovers evidence or indications of forced penetration of a CIA building, area or safekeeping equipment, he will take the following actions at once:

- a. Secure the room or area, barring all personnel.
- b. Lock the door or arrange for an office employee to stand guard over the door if a key is not readily available.
- c. Refrain from touching or disturbing the equipment, documents, building features or tools involved.
- d. Call the Chief, Inspection and Security, his Deputy, or the Chief, Security Branch, I. & S.
- e. Take no further action pending arrival of a Security representative.

2. These actions are necessary in order to preserve possible fingerprints or other potentially vital evidence; furthermore, they will permit a Security representative to be present when the appropriate members of the operation involved conduct the survey to determine whether any classified material is missing or has been disturbed.

3. Prompt action in securing the area and in reporting the penetration will permit Security representatives to make an immediate and thorough investigation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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DISTRIBUTION: All CIA Employees

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

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ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

13 October 1948

SUBJECT: Top Secret Control Procedures

STATINTL

Paragraph 7, Administrative Instruction  dated  
3 May 1948, is changed to read as follows:

"7. The Assistant Directors for Special Operations and Policy Coordination shall designate a Top Secret Control Officer for their Offices and shall establish adequate procedures for handling Top Secret material for all of their activities. The policies and procedures prescribed above will be followed as a general guide where operational conditions permit."

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Executive for  
Administration and Management

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO. 

3 May 1948

STATINTL

SUBJECT: Top Secret Control Procedures.

1. The purpose of this Instruction is to supplement CIA Security Regulations dated 15 August 1947 and to establish a greater degree of control for all material classified as Top Secret. Effective 17 May 1948, the organization and procedures for Top Secret controls within the Central Intelligence Agency are as follows:

2. Top Secret Controls

a. Central Top Secret Control is established in the Special Distribution Section of Central Records Division, Services Branch, A&M, which will be the central office of record for all Top Secret material processed within the Central Intelligence Agency and will exercise functional supervision over agency Top Secret control measures. The Top Secret Control Officer, CIA, is charged with supervision of the Central Top Secret Control.

b. Area Top Secret Controls

(1) Area Top Secret Controls will be established with approval of the Top Secret Control Officer and the appropriate Assistant Director or Staff Chief. The physical security of the area controls will be approved by the Executive for Inspection and Security. Area Top Secret Controls will be limited in number to a minimum consistent with operational needs. The following organizational locations are suggested:

- (a) Office of the Director
- (b) Advisory Council
- (c) Executive Registry, A&M
- (d) Central Records, A&M
- (e) Reference Center, A&M
- (f) Office of Reports and Estimates
- (g) Office of Collection and Dissemination
- (h) Office of Operations

(2) The Area Top Secret Controls will be administered by Alternate Top Secret Control Officers specifically designated for this purpose. Alternate Top Secret Control Officers, who may transmit and receive Top Secret material from outside agencies, and Assistant Top Secret Control Officers, who may transmit and receive Top Secret materials within CIA will be proposed by Assistant Directors or Staff Chiefs. Both Alternate and

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Assistant Top Secret Control Officers will be subject to approval of the Top Secret Control Officer and the Executive for Inspection and Security.

3. Three standard forms will be used to effect Top Secret Control:

a. Top Secret Log - (Form No. 38-14, April 1948). All Top Secret materials will be logged at all control points within each area.

b. Signature Record and Cover Sheet - (Form No. 38-13, April 1948). Each Top Secret document will be covered by this sheet at time of its entry into or origin within CIA. The name of each individual having access to, or knowledge of, the contents of the document will be recorded on this sheet. This form will remain attached to the Top Secret document continuously until the document is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside CIA, at which time the cover sheet will be forwarded to Central Top Secret Control.

c. Document Receipt - (Form No. 38-16, April 1948). This receipt will be prepared for Top Secret material by the Area Top Secret Control Officer and will be transmitted with all Top Secret material being forwarded out of CIA and will also be used for transmitting material within CIA when signature is not obtained on a Top Secret Log.

4. The Central Top Secret Control will:

a. Allocate a block of identifying CIA Top Secret Control for use in processing Top Secret material.

b. Assign a Top Secret Control number to all Top Secret documents initially received in Central Top Secret Control.

c. Provide overall supervision and assistance to the Area Top Secret controls.

d. Maintain a record system to enable ready accounting for all agency transactions involving Top Secret materials.

e. Periodically compile and appropriately distribute current lists of Agency Alternate and Assistant Top Secret Control Officers.

5. Area Top Secret Controls will:

a. Assign a Top Secret control number to each Top Secret document originating within his area or initially received in the area from a source outside CIA. This number will become the official CIA control number and will be used to record the document at all control points within CIA.

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b. Submit a copy (or transcript) of the Area Top Secret Log to Central Top Secret Control periodically as required by the Central Top Secret Control.

c. Install and maintain such additional decentralized controls as are necessary to discharge responsibilities for receiving, recording, distributing, reporting, or otherwise processing Top Secret material within the area in accordance with this instruction and applicable provisions of the Security Regulations.

d. Maintain a log to facilitate immediate location of all Top Secret material within the area.

e. Indoctrinate area personnel in need for, and operation of, Top Secret control procedures.

6. Violations of Security Regulations relating to Top Secret material will be reported promptly to the Executive for Inspection and Security, with simultaneous notification to the Top Secret Control Officer of CIA.

7. The Assistant Director for Special Operations shall designate a Top Secret Control Officer for his Office and shall establish adequate procedures for handling Top Secret material for all of his activities. The policies and procedures prescribed above will be followed as a general guide where operational conditions permit.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Executive for  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D.C.

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ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

17 March 1948

SUBJECT: Control of Personnel Security Files.

1. Quoted below is a memorandum received from the White House, dated March 13, 1948:

"Memorandum to All Officers and Employees in the Executive Branch of the Government:

"The efficient and just administration of the Employee Loyalty Program, under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, requires that reports, records, and files relative to the program be preserved in strict confidence. This is necessary in the interest of our national security and welfare, to preserve the confidential character and sources of information furnished, and to protect Government personnel against the dissemination of unfounded or disproved allegations. It is necessary also to insure the fair and just disposition of loyalty cases.

"For these reasons, and in accordance with the long-established policy that reports rendered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigative agencies of the executive branch are to be regarded as confidential, all reports, records, and files relative to the loyalty of employees or prospective employees (including reports of such investigative agencies), shall be maintained in confidence, and shall not be transmitted or disclosed except as required in the efficient conduct of business.

"Any subpoena or demand or request for information, reports, or files of the nature described, received from sources other than those persons in the executive branch of the Government who are entitled thereto by reason of their official duties, shall be respectfully declined, on the basis of this directive, and the subpoena or demand or other request shall be referred to the Office of the President for such response as the President may determine to be in the public interest in the particular case. There shall be no relaxation of the provisions of this directive except with my express authority.

"This directive shall be published in the Federal Register.

/S/ HARRY TRUMAN"

(5468)



CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NUMBER

4 February 1948

25X1A

SUBJECT: Release or Disclosure of Classified or Unclassified CIA  
Intelligence Material to the Congress of the United States.

1. The following policy will govern the release in writing, or the disclosure orally, of CIA intelligence material, whether classified or unclassified, to the Congress, its committees or individual members:

GENERAL POLICIES

2. Requests by members of Congress for intelligence material should ordinarily be made to the appropriate department or agency of primary interest. CIA may properly advise Congressmen of the department or agency best able to comply with their requests.

3. Each decision as to release of CIA material to members of the Congress will be made on the basis of the individual request.

4. Release of intelligence material up to and including CONFIDENTIAL may be authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consonance with known, or to-be-established, policies of the National Security Council.

5. Release of intelligence material with a classification of SECRET, or TOP SECRET must be authorized by the National Security Council, on advice of the Director. When deemed advisable by the Director, intelligence material classified RESTRICTED or CONFIDENTIAL will be referred to the NSC for authority for release.

6. a. Every request from the Congress for CIA intelligence material will be referred initially to the Office of the General Counsel.

b. The Office of the General Counsel will coordinate with the Assistant Director, OCD, and forward its recommendation in each case to the Executive Director.

c. The Assistant Director, OCD, will coordinate with, and obtain the approval of, the pertinent IAC agency when any of the material to be released comes from such an agency.

d. The Executive Director will inform the Office of the General Counsel of the final decision and action to be taken in each case, and the Office of the General Counsel will be responsible for implementing the decision.

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e. Extreme care will be exercised not to reveal the sources of intelligence information or the techniques or methods used in its collection.

f. All classified material released will bear the following notice:

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

g. Letters transmitting classified material will contain a request that if the material is not required for permanent retention, it be returned to CIA as soon as it has served the official needs of the recipient.

h. Upon request of the Office of the General Counsel in a particular case, material to be forwarded to the Congress will be sent to the Office of the General Counsel for transmission to the appropriate Member of Congress by hand.

i. Letters transmitting material classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher will contain a statement that as long as the material is retained by the addressee it must be stored in a three combination locked safe when not in use.

j. In making deliveries of material classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher, the following notice will be typed on the inner envelope: "TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY."

k. Security regulations concerning the procuring of receipts for the delivery of classified material will be complied with by obtaining the signature of either the addressee or a responsible individual of his office staff.

ORAL DISCLOSURE OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

7. a. Except for the Deputy Director, no officer or employee of the CIA will give testimony before a committee of the Congress without prior written authorization from the Director.

b. Except for the Deputy Director, any person on duty with, or employed by, the CIA, if requested to appear before a committee of the Congress will, without delay, inform the Office of the General Counsel, which office, in turn, will submit its written recommendation to the Director for consideration and decision.

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8. The requirements of this directive will be communicated to all employees now assigned or assigned in the future to CIA. Assistant Directors and Staff Chiefs are charged with this responsibility for all personnel under their jurisdiction.

*R. H. Hillenkoetter*  
R. H. HILLENKOETTER  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO. [ ]

5 August 1949

25X1A

SUBJECT: CIA Contact Security Policies for Non-IAC Agencies.

RESCISSION: Administrative Instruction [ ] dated 14 July 1947.

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REFERENCE: CIA Administrative Instruction [ ] dated 17 December 1948, subject: Operational Liaison.

1. The basic security policy and procedures covering operational liaison contacts are stated below.
2. The Chief of Inspection and Security will make security surveys of each non-IAC agency that has nominated a Liaison Clearing Authority and will currently maintain information regarding security procedures followed within these agencies for the safeguarding of classified information. Based upon those surveys, Contact Security Policy Memoranda will be issued announcing the rules and restrictions covering contacts with each agency.
3. Each Assistant Director and Staff Chief will issue intra-office instructions to carry out the established security policies, including required clearance from the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
4. Any proposed disclosure of CIA intelligence material to anyone other than the individuals named in the memoranda or in a classification higher than that authorized will be cleared with the Chief of Inspection and Security prior to such disclosure.
5. The information contained in the Contact Security Policy Memoranda could seriously embarrass the Central Intelligence Agency if it became available to unauthorized persons. Each recipient will insure that circulation is limited strictly to those within CIA who must know the contents in performance of their duties. These memoranda will not be discussed or disclosed in any way outside CIA. They will be kept in a bound cover in a restricted file. Any exception will be cleared with the Chief of Inspection and Security.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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14 July 1947

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPOPERATIONS MEMORANDUM  CIG CONTACT SECURITY POLICIES FOR  
NON-IAB AGENCIES*Revised*  
*by*    
*8/5/49*

Reference: CIG Operations Memorandum   dated  
19 February 1947, subject: Liaison  
Contacts of CIG With Government Agencies  
Other Than the IAB.

EFFECTIVE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE

1. General policy relating to the establishment of CIG contacts with agencies outside the IAB group is covered by the reference.

Established below is basic security policy concerning these contacts.

2. The Executive for Inspections and Security will make security surveys of each non-IAB agency that has nominated a contact clearing officer and will maintain the necessary up to date and detailed information regarding security procedures followed within these agencies for the safeguarding of classified information. Based upon these security surveys, he will issue in the name of the Director a series of consecutively numbered Contact Security Policy Memoranda, which will announce the rules and restrictions covering all contacts with each particular agency. These memoranda will be given sufficient dissemination within CIG to provide guidance for offices maintaining non-IAB contacts and will be revised from time to time as circumstances may necessitate.

3. Each Assistant Director and each Staff Chief who receives these memoranda will comply with the following:

a. As appropriate and necessary to his operations, he will prepare intra-office instructions to carry out in detail the established security policies. In drafting any such instructions a provision shall be made directing individuals establishing liaison with these agencies to obtain prior clearance from ICAPS.

b. Any proposed disclosure of CIG intelligence material to anyone other than the individuals named in the memoranda or in a

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classification higher than that provided in the particular instance, will be referred to the Executive for Inspections and Security for decision in the light of the particular circumstances, e.g. the character of the information, the reason such information should be disclosed, and such facts as may be available regarding the individual's loyalty and discretion. In each case he will cause the requisite checks to be made and prescribe appropriate procedure.

c. The information contained in the Contact Security Policy Memoranda could seriously embarrass the CIG if it became available to unauthorized persons. Therefore, in addition to the ordinary precautions required by the security classifications of these memoranda each recipient will take special pains to insure that their circulation is limited strictly to those who must know the policy in performance of their duties. All personnel given access to the information will be cautioned that it is not to be discussed or disclosed in any way outside the CIG. These memoranda will be kept in a bound cover when not in use and kept in a restrictive file in each office. Should any exception to the foregoing seem desirable, the matter will be discussed with the Executive for Inspections and Security.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Executive Director

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Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

16 February 1949

SUBJECT: Security Requirements for CIA Personnel Engaged in Private Foreign Travel.

(This rescinds Administrative Instruction  dated 2 September 1947.)

1. The policies and instructions contained herein apply to all individuals who go abroad in a private capacity during any period of employment or duty with the Central Intelligence Agency. They are not intended to interfere unduly with personal activities during travel abroad, but are essential from a CIA security aspect and for the personal protection of the individual concerned.

2. Prior to departure from a duty status:

a. Clearance will be obtained from the Chief of Inspection and Security.

b. Building passes and other CIA identification must be surrendered to the Chief of Inspection and Security.

c. Addresses through which the individual can be reached will be filed with the Administrative Officer of the office or staff activity in which employed.

d. Any personal papers or publications to accompany the individual will be carefully inspected by the individual concerned to insure that no information relative to CIA or his connection therewith is included.

3. In connection with applications for passports or visas:

a. There is no objection to identification as an employee of CIA, if found necessary. If name of employer and business address is required to obtain a visa, the official CIA address (Central Intelligence Agency, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington 25, D. C.) may be given.

b. The purpose of the trip will be stated as for personal business or pleasure.

c. Occupation, for entry in passports, will be stated in broad, general terms, e.g., "Administrator," "Executive," "Researcher," "Lawyer," "Secretary," "Stenographer," "Typist," "Clerk," etc. The designation "U.S. Government employee" is

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
Washington, D. C.

*Recorded*  
*by AI*    
2 September 1947 2/16/49

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MEMORANDUM  
NUMBER  

SUBJECT: Security Requirements for CIG Personnel Engaged in Private Foreign Travel

1. The policies and instructions contained herein apply to all individuals who go abroad in a private capacity during any period of employment or duty with the Central Intelligence Group. They are not intended to interfere unduly with personal activities during travel abroad, but are essential from a CIG security aspect and for the personal protection of the individual concerned.

2. Prior to departure from a duty status:

a. Clearance will be obtained from the Executive for Inspection and Security.

b. Building passes and other CIG identification must be surrendered to the Executive for Inspection and Security.

c. Addresses through which the individual can be reached will be filed with the Administrative Officer of the Office or Staff Section in which employed.

d. Any personal papers or publications to accompany the individual will be carefully inspected by the individual concerned to insure that no information relative to CIG or his connection therewith is included.

3. In connection with applications for passports or visas:

a. There is no objection to identification as an employee of CIG if found necessary. If name of employer and business address is required to obtain a visa, the official CIG address (Central Intelligence Group, 2430 "E" St., N.W., Washington, D.C.) may be given.

b. The purpose of the trip will be stated as for personal business or pleasure.

c. Occupation for entry in passports will be stated as "U.S. Government Employee".

d. Personal address for entry in passport will be stated as the residential address of the individual.

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4. It is particularly emphasized that in the course of private foreign travel CIG personnel should avoid any activity that gives the appearance of seeking to obtain or develop significant information. The interests of the CIG and its personnel will best be served if all persons will remember that during vacation or private business travel they have no operating responsibility to the CIG.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Executive for  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO. [ ]

20 July 1949

STATINTL

SUBJECT: Office and Branch Security Officers

STATINTL

Rescission: Administrative Instruction [ ] dated 25 August 1947

1. a. In order to implement effectively the CIA security program, each Assistant Director and Staff Head will appoint a security officer to be responsible to him for insuring compliance with CIA security regulations and policies within his organizational jurisdiction, to include:

- (1) Proper transmission of classified documents.
- (2) Observance of the regulations pertaining to the safeguarding and storage of classified information.
- (3) Enforcement of regulations and procedures pertaining to the control and handling of TOP SECRET material.
- (4) Development of an effective system of after-hour staff security checks of safes, offices, exposed classified data, etc.
- (5) Enforcement of regulations concerning the security of buildings and installations.
- (6) Security in office routine.
- (7) Regulations pertaining to admittance of visitors.
- (8) Restrictions on dissemination of classified information.
- (9) Recommending means of indoctrination of personnel in connection with maintaining prescribed security standards in conversation.
- (10). Coordinating with the Chief of Inspection and Security in the development of a program of continuing security education suitable for CIA and to the needs of a particular activity.
- (11). Maintaining adequate liaison with the appropriate operations of the Chief of Inspection and Security.

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b. Branch security officers should also be designated where operational requirements make it advantageous, for example:

Contact Branch, Office of Operations

Foreign Documents Branch, Office of Operations  
Office of the Personnel Officer  
Office of the Services Officer  
Office of the Budget Officer  
Office of the Management Officer

c. The functions of security officers will be performed in addition to their normal duties.

2. If not already done, the names of security officers appointed under this directive will be submitted to the Chief of Inspection and Security within one week from date of receipt of this directive. Subsequent changes will be promptly reported.

3. Security officers appointed for offices authorized to handle TOP SECRET material will be designated as alternate TOP SECRET control officers if not previously so designated.

4. Security officers appointed under this directive should not be below grade CAF-9 or P-3. They should preferably be above these grades.

5. Office and Branch security officers will not have access to Personnel Security Files of CIA personnel.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
Washington, D. C.

*revised by*

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MEMORANDUM  
NUMBER 25 August 1947 

SUBJECT: Office and Branch Security Officers

*7/20/49*

1. a. In order to increase the effectiveness of the CIG security program, each Assistant Director and Staff Head will appoint a security officer to be responsible to him for insuring compliance with CIG security regulations and policies within his organizational jurisdiction, to include:

- (1) Proper transmission of classified documents.
- (2) Observance of the regulations pertaining to the safeguarding and storage of classified information.
- (3) Enforcement of regulations and procedures pertaining to the control and handling of top secret material.
- (4) Development of an effective system of after hour staff security checks of safes, offices, exposed classified data, etc.
- (5) Enforcement of regulations concerning the security of buildings and installations.
- (6) Security in office routine.
- (7) Regulations pertaining to admittance of visitors.
- (8) Restrictions on dissemination of classified information.
- (9) Insuring maintenance of prescribed standard of security in conversation.
- (10) Coordinating with the Executive for Inspection and Security in the development of a program of continuing security education suitable for CIG and to the needs of a particular activity.
- (11) Maintaining adequate liaison with the appropriate operations of the Executive for Inspection and Security.

b. Branch security officers should also be designated for those branches whose operations are on a semi-independent basis. Examples are --

Dissemination Branch, OCD  
Contact Branch, O/O  
  
Documents Branch, O/O  
Reference Center, O/S

Personnel Branch, A&M  
Services Branch, A&M  
Budget and Finance Branch, A&M  
Management Branch, A&M

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c. The functions of security officers will be performed in addition to their normal duties.

2. The names of security officers appointed under this directive will be submitted to the Executive for Inspection and Security within one week from date of receipt of this directive. Subsequent changes will be promptly reported.

3. Security officers appointed for offices authorized to handle top secret material will be designated as alternate top secret control officers if not previously so designated.

4. Security officers appointed under this directive should not be below grade CAF-9 or P-3. They should preferably be above those grades.

5. Office and Branch security officers will not have access to Personal Security Files of CIG personnel.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Executive for  
Administration and Management

ATTACHMENTS: None

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D. C.

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ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NO.

19 July 1950.

25X1A

SUBJECT: Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with Central Intelligence Agency.

RESCISSION: Administrative Instruction  dated 8 March 1948.

1. Section 102d(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 states:  
"...under the direction of the National Security Council - the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods...."

2. In the discharge of this responsibility, it is imperative that personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Agency be:

a. Of excellent character, citizens of the United States for at least five years, and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin subject to a foreign power and,

b. Whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned and,

c. Whose financial habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any improper influences.

3. To assure that personnel (including those nominated by IAC agencies) assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Agency meet the standards prescribed in the foregoing paragraph, the following procedures will be applied in the investigation and clearance of such individuals:

a. Prior to entrance on duty with CIA, investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable the proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with provisions of paragraph 2, except for those individuals covered by provisions of paragraph 4, below.

b. The minimum investigation will consist of:

(1) A check of appropriate records of:

(a) Department of State.

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(b) Office of the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army.

(c) Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.

(d) Federal Bureau of Investigation (including fingerprint files).

(e) Police Department in each city of employment and residence in the United States covering the past fifteen (15) years.

(f) Credit agencies.

(g) Civil Service Commission.

(h) House Committee on Un-American Activities.

(i) Director of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.

(2) Verification of the individual's Personal History Statement regarding:

(a) Birth.

(b) Citizenship.

(c) Education.

(d) Employment for past fifteen (15) years.

(3) Character investigation by interviews with a sufficient number of personal references given by the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

c. Reports of investigations will be reviewed in each case by the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, who will make final decision as to the acceptability of the individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases which in his opinion should be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence for final decision.

4. Subject to satisfactory result of checks prescribed by paragraphs 3b (1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (g), (h) and (i), above, and with the approval of the Director, individuals whose records show a minimum of ten (10) years

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of honorable government service with no subsequent derogatory indications, or individuals who have been investigated by an accredited government agency within the past three (3) years with no subsequent derogatory indications, may be given provisional clearance to enter on temporary duty with CIA prior to completion of full security investigation. However, full investigation will be made in each case and final acceptance for permanent duty (assigned or attached) will be subject to satisfactory result of each investigation.

5. a. Individuals nominated by IAC agencies for duty with CIA will be accepted only under conditions prescribed in paragraphs 3 and 4, above.

b. Each nomination should contain statements to the effect that the individual nominated:

(1) Has (or has not) had a minimum of ten (10) years prior honorable government service.

(2) Is (or is not) cleared for handling Top Secret material in the nominating agency.

(3) Is considered by the nominating agency, based on such information and records as are available in the agency, to possess qualities of integrity and loyalty sufficient to warrant assignment to duties involving matters of concern to the national security.

6. All personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Agency will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy.

7. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, all personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Agency activities as well as the provisions of the applicable laws and statutes.

8. Clearance of consultants to be employed on an intermittent basis will be governed by the following instructions:

a. Clearance will be obtained from the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, prior to contacting any individual to determine willingness to serve CIA as a consultant.

b. After determination of willingness has been obtained:

(1) Full security investigation will be made in each case as prescribed for permanent employees.

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(2) Clearances, when granted, will be:

(a) For not in excess of six-month periods, subject to renewal when concurred in by the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, in each case.

(b) Granted with stated restrictions if security investigation indicates that full clearance cannot be granted and sufficient justification for restricted employment can be presented by the CIA activity concerned. Such justification will include the circumstances under which the consultant will be used and the classification of information to be divulged. The personal approval of the Director will be required for each restricted clearance.

(3) Approval of the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, must be obtained in each case prior to utilizing the services of a consultant within any of the premises of CIA.

9. Any exception to the foregoing provisions will require the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Acting Executive

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D.C.

*Rescinded*  
[Redacted Box]  
8 March 1948 11750

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION  
NUMBER [Redacted Box]

SUBJECT: Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with Central  
Intelligence Agency

(This rescinds Administrative Instruction [Redacted Box] dated 1 May 1947.)

1. Section 102d(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 states:  
"...under the direction of the National Security Council - the Director  
of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence  
sources and methods...."

2. In the discharge of this responsibility, it is imperative that  
personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence  
Agency be:

- a. Of excellent character, and citizens of the United States  
who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin subject  
to a foreign power and,
- b. Whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness  
are unquestioned and,
- c. Whose financial habits are such as to render unlikely their  
succumbing to any improper influences.

3. To assure that personnel (including those nominated by IAC agen-  
cies) assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence  
Agency meet the standards prescribed in the foregoing paragraph, the fol-  
lowing procedures will be applied in the investigation and clearance of  
such individuals:

a. Prior to entrance on duty with CIA, investigation will be  
conducted to the extent necessary to enable the proper determina-  
tion of an individual's eligibility in accordance with provisions  
of paragraph 2, except for those individuals covered by provisions  
of paragraph 4 below.

b. The minimum investigation will consist of:

(1) A check of appropriate records of:

- (a) Department of State.
- (b) Office of the Director of Intelligence, Depart-  
ment of the Army.

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(c) Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.

(d) Federal Bureau of Investigation (to include fingerprint files).

(e) Police Department in each city of employment and residence in the United States covering the past fifteen (15) years.

(f) Credit agencies.

(g) Civil Service Commission.

(h) House Committee on Un-American Activities.

(i) Director of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.

(2) Verification of the individual's Personal History Statement regarding:

(a) Birth

(b) Citizenship.

(c) Education.

(d) Employment for past fifteen (15) years.

(3) Character investigation by interviews with a sufficient number of personal references given by the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

c. Reports of investigations will be reviewed in each case by the Executive for Inspection and Security who will make final decision as to the acceptability of the individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases which in his opinion should be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence for final decision.

4. Subject to satisfactory result of checks prescribed by paragraph 3b (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) (g) (h) and (i) above, and with the approval of the Director, individuals whose records show a minimum of ten (10) years of honorable government service with no subsequent derogatory indications, or individuals who have been investigated by an accredited government

## CONFIDENTIAL

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agency within the past three (3) years with no subsequent derogatory indications, may be given provisional clearance to enter on temporary duty with CIA prior to completion of full security investigation. However, full investigation will be made in each case and final acceptance for permanent duty (assigned or attached) will be subject to satisfactory result of each investigation.

5. a. Individuals nominated by IAC agencies for duty with CIA will be accepted only under conditions prescribed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.

b. Each nomination should contain statements to the effect that the individual nominated:

(1) Has (or has not) had a minimum of 10 years' prior honorable government service.

(2) Is (or is not) cleared for handling Top Secret material in the nominating agency.

(3) Is considered by the nominating agency, based on such information and records as are available in the agency, to possess qualities of integrity and loyalty sufficient to warrant assignment to duties involving matters of concern to the national security.

6. All personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Agency will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy.

7. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, all personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Agency activities as well as the provisions of the applicable laws and statutes.

8. Clearance of consultants to be employed on an intermittent basis will be governed by the following instructions:

a. Clearance will be obtained from the Executive for Inspection and Security prior to contacting any individual to determine willingness to serve CIA as a consultant.

b. After determination of willingness has been obtained:

(1) Full security investigation will be made in each case as prescribed for permanent employees.

(2) Clearance, when granted, will be:

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(a) For not in excess of six-month periods, subject to renewal when concurred in by the Executive for Inspection and Security in each case.


(b) Granted with stated restrictions if security investigation indicates that full clearance cannot be granted and sufficient justification for restricted employment can be presented by the CIA activity concerned. Such justification will include the circumstances under which the consultant will be used and the classification of information to be divulged. The personal approval of the Director will be required for each restricted clearance.

(3) Approval of the Executive for Inspection and Security must be obtained in each case prior to utilizing the services of a consultant within any of the premises of CIA.

9. Any exception to the foregoing provisions will require the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
Washington, D. C.MEMORANDUM  
NUMBER 

1 May 1947

SUBJECT: Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with  
Central Intelligence GroupEFFECTIVE UNTIL 30 JUNE 1947 UNLESS SOONER RESCINDED

C.I.G. Administrative Order  Subject: "Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with Central Intelligence Group", dated 25 October 1946, is hereby rescinded effective this date, and the following is substituted therefor:

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, states: "In the conduct of their activities, the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. In the discharge of this responsibility, it is imperative that personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

- a. Of excellent character who are citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;
- b. Whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;
- c. Whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

3. To assure that personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group meet the standards prescribed in the foregoing paragraph, the following procedures will be applied in the investigation and clearance of such individuals:

- a. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable the proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with provisions of Paragraph 2, except for those individuals covered by provisions of Paragraph 4 below. The minimum investigation will consist of:

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4. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records indicating a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service with no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Director of Central Intelligence, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for assignment to or attachment

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for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. However, in each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of appropriate records of the Department of State; Office of the Director of Intelligence; War Department; Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be made.

5.
  - a. When an IAB member agency is requested to detail personnel to duty with the Central Intelligence Group, nominations of individuals for such duty will include a written statement certifying to their loyalty and general integrity based upon knowledge available in the nominating agency.
  - b. Such individuals, when accepted, will be permitted to enter on duty with CIG provisionally, but will thereafter be checked for security in the same manner as for all other individuals entering on duty (see para. 3 and 4 above).
6. Only upon specific approval of the Director of Central Intelligence in each case will an individual be permitted to enter on duty with the Central Intelligence Group prior to the completion of the full security clearance proscribed herein.
7. All personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.
8. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group, all personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities as well as the provisions of the applicable laws and statutes.
9. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

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Executive for Personnel  
and Administration

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

## C. I. G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR  
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP*rescinded*  
*by* [ ]  
*5/1/47*

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1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, states: "In the conduct of their activities, the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. In the discharge of this responsibility, it is imperative that personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. Of excellent character who are citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power:

b. Whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;

c. Whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

3. To assure that personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group meet the standards prescribed in the foregoing paragraph, the following procedures will be applied in the investigation and clearance of such individuals:

a. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable the proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with provisions of Paragraph 2, except for those individuals covered by provisions of Paragraph 4 below. The minimum investigation will consist of

(1) A check of appropriate records of each of the following:

- (a) Department of State.
  - (b) Office of the Director of Intelligence, War Department
  - (c) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department,
  - (d) Federal Bureau of Investigation ( to include fingerprint files
  - (e) Police Department in each city of employment and residence
- in the United States for past fifteen (15) years.

25 October 1946

## (2) Verification of the individual's personal history

Statement regarding:

- (a) Birth.
- (b) Citizenship.
- (c) Education.
- (d) Employment for past fifteen (15) years.

(3) Character investigation by interviews with personal references given by the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

b. Reports of investigations will be reviewed in each case by the Security Officer of the Central Intelligence Group who will verify that the above procedure has been carried out. Final decision as to the acceptability of the individual for assignment of the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records indicating a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service with no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Director of Central Intelligence, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for assignment to or attachment for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. However, in each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of appropriate records of the Department of State; Office of the Director of Intelligence, War Department; Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be made.

5. In the event that a member Department is requested by the Director of Central Intelligence to nominate an individual of the member Department for duty with the Central Intelligence Group, it is expected that such a nomination, when transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, will be accompanied by a written statement to the effect that the nominating Department, based upon its own knowledge of the individual recommended, certifies to his loyalty and fitness for duty.



25 October 1946

6. Only upon specific approval of the Director of Central Intelligence in each case will an individual be permitted to enter on duty with the Central Intelligence Group prior to the completion of the full security clearance prescribed herein.

7. All personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

8. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities as well as the provisions of the applicable laws and statutes.

9. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:



Deputy Executive for Personnel

and Administration

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5 August 1946*rescinded by*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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C.I.G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER*12/17/48*SECURITY OF ACTIVITIES PERTAINING TO  
THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. In view of the importance of limiting knowledge of the activities of the Office of Special Operations, the additional instructions contained in this memorandum pertaining to security of that office are applicable to all personnel of the Central Intelligence Group.

a. Personnel of Special Operations, C.I.G., have been instructed to confine their contacts and visits to other offices of C.I.G. to the minimum necessary to transact official business. All personnel of other offices and staffs of C.I.G. will similarly confine their contacts with and visits to Special Operations to the minimum necessary to transact official business.


b. Likewise, it is highly desirable that contacts with State, War, Navy and other Departments of the Government pertaining to the business of Special Operations be confined to the minimum and that these contacts be controlled by Special Operations. The Assistant Director for Special Operations, C.I.G., has designated the Control Branch, Special Operations, as his agency to control and conduct these contacts. Consequently, all personnel of the staff and other offices of C.I.G., including personnel of the Personnel and Administrative Branch, assigned to operational

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support of the Office of Special Operations, who desire to make outside contacts concerning the business of the Office of Special Operations will, before making such contacts, clear their business concerning outside departments and agencies with the Control Branch, Special Operations.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:



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